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ABSTRACT
Previous empirical studies that have examined the links between pharmaceutical price controls,
profits, cash flows, and investment in research and development (R&D) have been largely based on
retrospective statistical analyses of firm- and/or industry-level data. These studies, which have
contributed numerous insights and findings to the literature, relied upon ad hoc reduced-form model
specifications. In the current paper we take a very different approach: a prospective micro-simulation
approach. Using Monte Carlo techniques we model how future price controls in the U.S. will impact
early-stage product development decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. This is done within the
context of a net present value (NPV) framework that appropriately reflects the uncertainty associated
with  R&D  project  technical  success,  development  costs,  and  future  revenues.  Using  partial-
information estimators calibrated with the most contemporary clinical and economic data available,
we demonstrate how pharmaceutical price controls will significantly diminish the incentives to
undertake early-stage R&D investment. For example, we estimate that cutting prices by 40 to 50
percent in the U.S. will lead to between 30 to 60 percent fewer R&D projects being undertaken (in
early-stage development). Given the recent legislative efforts to control prescription drug prices in
the U.S., and the likelihood that price controls will prevail as a result, it is important to better
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate over prescription drug prices in the United States is both contentious and 
longstanding.  Politicians and consumer groups have been calling for government price 
controls for well over a decade.  Industry  representatives, however, argue that current 
pricing structures are necessary to cover the high fixed cost of research and development 
(R&D) and to induce future investment in R&D.  In the midst of these debates it appears 
that  the  regulatory  landscape  is  about  to  change:  the  recent  passage  of  the  Medicare 
Modernization Act (MMA) in 2003 and the anticipated ratification of a reimportation bill 
are  evidence of  an overarching policy  agenda that seeks to provide  greater  access to 
today’s medicines.  It seems likely, therefore, that pharmaceutical price controls are just 
‘around the corner.’  Indeed, the U.S. pharmaceutical market is currently the only market 
in the world where drug prices remain largely unregulated.  In every other major market, 
governments regulate drug prices either directly or indirectly (Danzon, 2000). 
 While there is little doubt that expanding access to currently marketed medicines 
through price controls (or possibly reimportation) would benefit consumers in the short 
run, the net social welfare effect of such a policy is unknown.  This is because the long-
run costs of price controls, in terms reduced pharmaceutical innovation, may be quite 
substantial (Grabowski, 1994; Scherer, 2001; Vernon, 2004).  The research in this paper 
will focus on this latter cost, and specifically the impact price controls in the U.S. will 
have on firm-level R&D investment behavior.  To date, there have been very few studies 
that have examined this important tradeoff from a rigorous empirical perspective, and no 
studies have examined this tradeoff from a microeconomic, firm-level perspective, using 
standard  financial  modeling  techniques,  such  as  net  present  value  analyses  (NPV).    3 
Instead, previous studies have employed retrospective statistical analyses of firm- and 
industry-level data, using ad hoc reduced-form empirical specifications.   
Our approach in this paper will therefore be more closely aligned with the actual 
structure of the firm R&D investment decision.  Specifically, we will use Monte Carlo 
simulation analyses and partial information (i.e., Stein) estimators to model the impact of 
various U.S. price control policies on the level of investment in pharmaceutical R&D.  
This will be done within the context of a hypothetical firm’s early-stage R&D investment 
decision-making process.  We find that R&D investment is quite sensitive to U.S. price 
expectations, and policies regulating drug prices in the U.S. could lead to a significant 
decline in industry R&D expenditures.      
Our paper will proceed as follows.  Section II will review the literature on the 
linkages between pharmaceutical price regulation, profits, cash flows, and investment in 
R&D.  This section will also identify how our approach represents a more formal, micro-
theoretic  approach  to  quantifying  the  effects  of  price  controls  on  R&D  investment.  
Section III will provide a background on the pharmaceutical R&D process and present 
our  conceptual  model.    Data  used  in  calibrating  the  financial  simulation  model  are 
presented  and  discussed  in  Section  IV.    In  Section  V  we  present  and  discuss  our 
simulation results.  Section VI considers policy implications and concludes.  
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Economic theory is unambiguous in its prediction that pharmaceutical price controls in 
the United States will diminish the incentives to invest in new drug R&D
1.  However, 
                                                            
1 Own-price elasticity estimates for pharmaceuticals have been consistently inelastic. Thus, even though the 
quantity of prescription medications demanded will increase (under price controls), total revenues will   4 
very  few  studies  have  examined  this  prediction  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  from  an 
empirical perspective.  Notable exceptions include Grabowski (1994), Scherer (2001), 
Vernon (2003, 2004) and Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005).  An overview of these 
studies is provided in the current section, along with a description of how our study will 
approach  this  empirical  question  from  a  very  different  perspective:  one  that  is  more 
firmly grounded in microeconomic theory and the financial decision-making processes of 
the firm.  
  The literature on the relationship between pharmaceutical price regulation and 
firm  R&D  investment  has  employed  a  variety  of  methodological  techniques  and 
approaches.  These have included retrospective statistical analyses of firm- and industry-
level data (Vernon, 2004; Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon, 2005), prospective simulation 
analyses  in  the  spirit  of  Nelson  and  Winter’s  (1982)  evolutionary  economic  models 
(Vernon, 2003), and other, more general quantitative analyses that have documented the 
close links between gross pharmaceutical profitability, cash flows, and R&D investment.  
In the case of the later, the argument was informally made that the effect of price controls 
will be to reduce current and expected future profits (and also cash flows), which in turn 
will reduce R&D expenditures (Grabowski 1994 and Scherer 2001).  We will begin by 
reviewing these earlier studies, upon which the more recent studies were based. 
  In  his  analysis  of  how  the  Clinton  Administration’s  proposed  1993  Health 
Security Act would impact pharmaceutical R&D investment, Grabowski (1994) assumed 
that  U.S.  regulators  would  employ  a  cost-based  standard  similar  to  that  followed  by 
regulatory  agencies  for  electricity  and  other  public  utilities.    More  specifically, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decline. The most recent GAO study examining the likely expenditures under the new MMA utilized an 
elasticity estimate of –0.30, which was based on a study by Coulson & Stuart (1995).   5 
Grabowski assumed that the proposed Act, which called for a Council on Breakthrough 
New Drugs, would target only the top-selling products and regulate prices in a manner 
that resulted in their after-tax present value net revenues equaling the average after-tax 
cost  of  developing  a  new  drug.    This  analysis  demonstrated  how  such  a  regulatory 
approach would result in pharmaceutical R&D investment, on average, having a negative 
expected net present value (NPV).  This is because, as Grabowski noted, only 3 out of 
every 10 pharmaceutical products generate after-tax present value returns in excess of 
average, after-tax R&D costs (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000).  As will be discussed in 
detail in Section III, our approach will be based on a formal financial simulation model 
adapted from Grabowski’s work: one that closely examines the firm R&D investment 
decision and distinguishes between expected returns to R&D on average, and expected 
returns  on  a  project-by-project  basis  given  some  degree  of  information  on  how  a 
particular project differs from the average project. 
  In a more recent and more empirically based study, Scherer (2001) documented 
the  remarkably  close  link  between  gross  pharmaceutical  profitability  and  R&D 
investment at the industry level.  This link, which Scherer found held tightly both when 
measured in absolute levels and in deviations from an exponential trend, was argued to 
exist for two principle reasons: 1) in the presence of capital market imperfections (when 
internal funds represent a cheaper source of R&D finance relative to external debt or 
equity), profits exert a positive influence on firm R&D spending through a cash-flow, or 
financing, effect, and 2) future profit expectations, which are tempered inter alia with 
current market conditions, and thus contemporaneous pharmaceutical profits, can result 
in a demand-pull influence on R&D investment.  Indeed, in subsequent research, Vernon   6 
(2004) observed a high correlation between contemporary pharmaceutical profit margins 
and  firm  market  capitalizations,  which  are  a  well-known  measure  of  future  profit 
expectations  (Grunfeld,  1958;  Grunfeld  and  Griliches,  1960).    Another  reason  why 
pharmaceutical profitability and R&D might be linked, as Scherer noted, is that R&D 
leads  to  new  products,  which  in  turn  lead  to  future  profits.    However,  as  Scherer 
emphasized, this linkage occurs with considerable lags, and is thus unlikely to explain the 
relationship observed in his data, which was a contemporary relationship between current 
profits and current R&D.  Finally, Scherer, like Grabowski, concluded that any regulatory 
policy—such as price controls—adversely affecting pharmaceutical profitability would 
result in a decline in industry R&D investment.  In contrast to these studies, more recent 
research has examined the mapping between price regulation and pharmaceutical R&D 
investment explicitly and in a more structural fashion.  These studies are briefly reviewed 
next. 
  Building upon the earlier work by Grabowski and Vernon (1981, 1990, 2000), 
Vernon (2004) utilized firm-level financial data for 14 major pharmaceutical firms from 
1994 to 1997 to estimate models of the determinants of firm R&D investment.  Within 
the  context  of  these  empirical  models,  he  took  advantage  of  a  unique  stylized  fact: 
relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. pharmaceutical market is relatively unregulated 
with respect to price. Using this fact in conjunction with data on the distribution of firm 
pharmaceutical sales across U.S. and non-U.S. markets, and firm-level pharmaceutical 
profitability  in  each  year,  he  estimated  average  pharmaceutical  price-cost  margins  in 
these  two  broadly  classified  markets,  and  argued  much  of  this  difference  could  be 
attributed to price regulation. Using these profit margin estimates within the context of a   7 
system  of  quasi-structural  equations,  Vernon  modeled  how  R&D  investment  would 
change (decline) if prices in the U.S. were regulated in a manner that resulted in pre-tax 
pharmaceutical profit margins in the U.S. falling, on average, to the level observed in 
non-U.S. markets.  The result from this hypothetical policy analysis, while accompanied 
by several caveats, was that R&D would decline, ceteris paribus, by approximately 25 to 
33 percent. 
  Whereas Vernon modeled the mappings from profitability and lagged cash flows 
into R&D investment, Giaccotto, Santerre and Vernon (2005) modeled the more direct 
relationship between pharmaceutical prices and R&D investment.  This study employed 
time series econometric techniques to explain R&D  growth rates using industry-level 
data from 1952 to 2001.  The researchers found that real pharmaceutical prices in the 
U.S. (defined as the ratio of the pharmaceutical price index to the consumer price index) 
are  a  major  determinant  of  industry-level  R&D  investment,  and  obtained  an  R&D 
elasticity estimate (with respect to real pharmaceutical prices) of 0.583.  This suggests 
that for every 10 percent increase (decrease) in real pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. 
R&D  investment  increases  (decreases)  5.83  percent.    Using  this  short-run  elasticity 
estimate, the authors modeled the forgone R&D (capitalized to 2001) that would have 
accompanied a U.S. price control policy that limited the rate of growth in pharmaceutical 
prices  to  the  rate  of  inflation  from  1980  to  2001.    This  policy  scenario,  while  both 
retrospective and hypothetical in nature, was nevertheless based on an actual legislative 
approach employed under the Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992, which limited drug 
prices increases for federal agency purchases to the rate of growth of the urban consumer 
price index.  Under such a price control policy in the U.S., the authors estimated that   8 
capitalized industry R&D expenditures would have been approximately 30 percent lower 
than the observed level for this time period. 
  In  yet  another  approach,  Vernon  (2003)  employed  Monte  Carlo  simulation 
techniques  to  model  the  long-run  impact  of  various  types  of  U.S.  price  controls  on 
pharmaceutical innovation.  Specifically, he ran simulation experiments over a 50-year 
time horizon based upon public-utility type, cost-based price controls that targeted only 
the  top-selling  pharmaceutical  products:  those  products  generating  present  value  net 
revenues in excess of average, capitalized R&D costs.  Several other, less extreme forms 
of  price  control  experiments  targeting  top-selling  products  were  also  run.    While the 
simulation  experiments  were  based  upon  a  hypothetical  pharmaceutical  industry,  the 
industry was, however, constructed to reflect many of the relevant aspects of innovation 
and competition found in today’s global pharmaceutical industry. The industry model, 
which was developed in the spirit of Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary economic models, 
was  driven  by  firm  routines.    It  was  also  calibrated  using  the  most  contemporary 
technical, financial and cost data available at the time (DiMasi, 1995; DiMasi, Hansen 
and Grabowski, 1991, 2003; Grabowski and Vernon, 2000). 
  The mechanism through which price controls impacted R&D investment, and thus 
future drug discoveries and the number of new products brought to market was through a 
reduction in the internal funds used to finance firm R&D investment.  Given the wide 
range of price control policies simulated, the results were similarly broad, and depending 
on the types of price controls employed, annual innovative output (the number of new 
products brought to market by the industry in a given year) fell relative to baseline (with 
no price controls) by between 21 and 73 percent.  More relevant, however, cumulative   9 
innovative output (the total number of new products brought to market over the 50-year 
time horizon modeled) fell relative to baseline by between 6 and 37 percent.  There is, 
however, a major draw back to this evolutionary modeling approach: R&D investment is 
based upon firm routines and cash flows exclusively. Thus, R&D investment in Vernon’s 
model was reactive and not forward looking.  As such, only realized profitability, which 
increased the level of a firm’s internal funds, determined R&D investment.    
  While recent research has come a long way in quantifying the potential effect that 
a U.S. price control policy in the U.S. will have on firm R&D investment, no study has 
been  grounded  within  the  context  of  a  formal  investment-decision-making  process.  
Grabowski’s study examined this process at the very highest level, using average returns 
and costs.  However, firms do not make investment decisions in this manner.  Instead, 
firms  make  investment  decisions  in  a  sequential  and  project-by-project  fashion.  
Therefore, our approach in this paper is to model this process using simulation techniques 
that account for the ex ante uncertainty around R&D project costs, developmental success 
rates, and the financial returns to successfully-launched products.  The next section of 
this paper outlines our conceptual model in detail. 
 
III.   BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
The  Pharmaceutical  R&D  process  is  one  of  discovering,  developing,  and  bringing  to 
market  new  ethical  drug  products.    For  a  compound  to  make  it  to  market,  it  must 
successfully  pass  through  several  stages  of  research  and  development:  discovery 
research, pre-clinical testing in animals, and clinical testing in humans (of which there are 
three phases: I, II, and III).  Finally, subsequent to these R&D stages, the new drug must   10 
receive  FDA  approval  for  marketing  in  the  U.S.    This  scientific  process  is  heavily 
regulated  and  involves  significant  technical  risk:  only  one  in  several  thousand 
investigational compounds ever makes it through the full development process to gain 
FDA approval (PhRMA Industry Profile, 2004). The vast majority of R&D projects fail 
for reasons related to safety, efficacy, or commercial viability.  For compounds that do 
gain FDA approval, and are thus brought to market, the entire process from discovery to 
launch takes on average approximately 15 years (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003).  
The pharmaceutical R&D process is illustrated below in Figure 1.  
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The  economic  cost  of  developing  an  FDA-approved  drug  is  significantly 
influenced by both the technical risk of the R&D and the long investment time horizon.  
This is because of expenditures on R&D projects that ultimately fail and the opportunity 
cost associated with the firm’s R&D capital.  A common practice in the literature is to 
capitalize R&D expenditures up to the year of FDA approval.  This capitalized value, 
which incorporates expenditures on both successful and failed R&D projects, represents 
the true economic cost of bringing a new drug to market.  Mathematically, the expected 
average cost per drug developed by a given firm at the time of FDA approval (year n) can 
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The variables in equation (1) are defined as follows:   11 
n C  = the average capitalized cost per drug approved at time of approval (year n); 
t c   =  the average annual cost per R&D project in year t; 
t p  =  the annual probability a project will advance in development (note: 1 0 = p ); 
r   =  the firm’s cost of capital.  
 
One recent estimate places this cost on a pre-tax basis at $802 million (DiMasi, Hansen 
and Grabowski, 2003), although both higher and lower estimates exist.  On an after-tax 
basis, assuming the firm has sufficient revenues to capture the tax benefits of R&D or is 
in a position to sell these tax benefits, the estimated cost of developing an average drug is 
$480 million (Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi, 2002).     
In exchange for investing in these research projects, the firm ultimately hopes to 
bring to market products that it can sell.  Although individually there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about which projects will succeed and what the product net revenues will be, 
one  can  estimate  the  corresponding  average  present  value  of  net  revenues  from  a 
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where,  
n R  = the average present value of revenues per drug approved (year n); 
t r   =  the average annual revenue in year t; 
 
Grabowski,  Vernon  and  DiMasi  2002  estimate  the  present  value  of  the  average  net 
revenues to by $525 million, after tax.  Thus, at the time of a product launch, the average 
economic value of pharmaceutical research and development activities is approximately 
$45 million
2.   
                                                            
2 Although one might be tempted to call this Net Present Value, that would be incorrect.  The term Net 
Present Value is generally a forward looking construct used in decision making to assess the present value   12 
n n C R EV - =                 (3) 
This value is what provides the incentives for investment in the pharmaceutical industry, 
and under current conditions it appears that on average there is an incentive for continued 
investment. 
  In our analysis, we want to look at this economic value at the time of the 
first critical decision point in the life of a pharmaceutical product’s development, the time 
of the Phase I Go / No Go decision.  This is the point at which a company decides a 
compound it has been examining in the laboratories is ready for testing in humans.  All of 
the in vitro and animal testing is complete, the mechanism of action is reasonably well 
understood, and there is a general belief that the compound has a favorable benefit-risk 
ratio for a specific indication.  It is also at this point that the first financial modeling of 
the compound’s commercial potential is conducted.  We denote the time of this decision 
as  t  =  0,  and  develop  a  simple,  net  present  value  decision-analytic  model  of  how  a 
rational, profit-maximizing firm decides on whether or not to extend an R&D project into 
Phase I clinical development.  This key developmental decision, referred to as the Phase I 
Go/No-Go decision, is described next. 
 
The Phase 1 Go/No-Go Decision 
 
As  previously  indicated,  the  structural  aspects  of  our  model  will  be  couched 
within the context of the firm’s financial decision of whether or not to take an R&D 
project into clinical development.  This decision, referred to as the Phase I Go/No-Go 
decision, is one of the most critical developmental decisions in the pharmaceutical R&D 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of all future cash flows.  In this case, the costs have already been incurred (i.e are sunk) and hence should 
not be included in the decision making at time n.   13 
process.  Moreover, as will be discussed in fuller detail in Section III, it is at this stage in 
the R&D process that good data first become available on the average costs, times, and 
technical  success  rates  of  particular  R&D  investment  projects:  a  requirement  for  the 
simulation model we develop.  Therefore, in our analyses of how pharmaceutical price 
constraints in the U.S. will impact R&D investment expenditures, we will focus on this 
critical investment decision-making node. 
  When considering whether or not to take a specific R&D project into Phase I 
clinical  development,  the  determining  criterion  is  the  project’s  expected  net  present 
value, NPV0. 
) | ( 0 0 0 0 I C R E NPV
i i i - =               (4) 
where 
i C0 is the present value of development costs at launch date n for project i, and is 
expressed explicitly as follows: 
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t c  is the development costs for project i in year t. 
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where  i
t r  is the revenues for project i in year t.   
Clearly, at this early stage in development there is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether a project will advance through all subsequent development stages (technical risk) 
and  what  the  developmental  costs  will  be  in  each  year.    Moreover,  if  successful  in 
reaching the market, there is also a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the financial   14 
success  (or  failure) the  product will experience.  The uncertainty  around future sales 
revenues  is  driven  by  factors  related  to  same-therapeutic  class  competitors,  new  and 
possibly unforeseen technological developments, general market conditions, and political 
dynamics such as new regulations or policies affecting the profitability and or prices of 
pharmaceuticals.   Indeed, historical returns to  pharmaceutical R&D have been highly 
skewed, with recent research suggesting that only 3 out of 10 products generate after-tax 
returns in excess of the average after-tax cost of R&D (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi 
2002).   
In developing our conceptual model it is important to carefully consider the 
information set available to the firm as it makes this decision.  Differences in the 
information set can yield huge differences in the valuation of equation (4).  Before 





If we assume that the firm has perfect foresight, and knows not only whether or 
not the project will be successful, but also exactly what the future costs and revenues will 
be.  Under these assumptions, we can write the net present value of the project as follows: 
] [ 0 0 0
i i i C R NPV - =                                           (5) 
where 
i
n C  and 
i R0are defined above. 
 Under these assumptions, firms never invest in 
projects that fail, and the net present value of successful R&D projects is very high – 
we’ve assumed away all technical risk.  Clearly, under these conditions, a pharmaceutical 
firm would only invest in those projects with positive NPV (i.e. successful ones).   15 
  Unfortunately, this is not a very realistic model of behavior in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Fewer than 1 out of every 5 projects started in clinical development actually 
reach the market as a product. Factoring in the uncertainty around technical success is 
essential  to  understanding  the  behavior  of  the  industry.    In  fact,  the  pharmaceutical 
industry has come under intense criticism for focusing on only minor innovations (me-too 
products) because of their greater probability of success, at the expense of conducting 





If we acknowledge that the firm is not able to predict project success, but instead 
assume that they have full information with respect to developmental costs and revenues, 
then the only source of uncertainty is the technical success of the project, and we can re-
write the net present value for an investment project as 
] * [ 0 0 0
i i i C R P FNPV - =                                         (6) 
where C0
i is the now the expected cost of development for project i taking into account 
that the project may fail in development (and hence only some of the developmental costs 
will  be  incurred).    Therefore,  we  represent  the  expected  present  value  of  bring 
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where the probability of successfully completing year t of development is given by  t p .   16 
At the same time, the revenues will only be received if the project is successful at 
all stages, thus the expected revenues must be multiplied by the overall probability of 








                 
and the other terms are defined as before.  In this case the firm is assumed to know the 
true probability of success for each developmental stage. 
 
No Private Information 
 
In some cases, firms have little or no private project-specific information.  In this 
case,  the  firm  could  still  form  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  project  based  on  the 
knowledge that it came from this underlying distribution.  It can form the NPV based on 
the average values of the parameters, that is 
n
n n r C R ANPV
- + - = ) 1 ]( [ 0                       (7) 
where  n C  is given in equation (1) as the average, expected cost of project development, 
and  n R  is the average, present value of future revenues, given in equation (2).  We have 
essentially simply discounted the economic value of the project, as defined in equation 




In practice, firms do not know the true costs of development and future revenues, 
and instead must form estimates of these critical parameters.  Specifically, we assume 
that firms form expectations conditional on the information set available to them.     17 
)] | ( ) | ( * [ ) | ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 I C E I R E P I NPV E
i i i - =         (8) 
If we assume that the firm treats the probability of success at each stage of development 
as fixed (across projects), equation (8) is linear in the unknown costs and revenues.  This 
means  that  without  loss  of  generality,  we  can  replace  each  with  their  appropriate 
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Our analytical technique focuses on this conditional expectations model of firm 
behavior.  In particular, we assume that a firm will move a project into Phase I clinical 
development, if and only if E(NPV0
i | I0) > 0 for project i.  That is, ex ante, the firm 
expects to make a profit by investing in the project.  Specifically, we will examine how 
these expectations are impacted by changes in the political environment, as summarized 
by changes in the expectations of future prices and revenues. 
 
Distribution of Potential Projects 
 
To  determine  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  political  environment  on  the 
investment  decisions  of  firm  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  we  must  examine  the 
distribution  of  E(NPV
i
0  |  I0)  using  simulation  techniques.    Specifically,  we  view  an 
individual project as a draw from a known distribution F(C
i,R
i), where C
i is a vector of   18 
the actual developmental costs, and R
i is a vector of potential future revenues
3.  Although 
these vectors are observed by us, the researchers, firms do not have access to the same 
information.  Instead, firms must form expectations about these costs and revenues based 
on their private information (I0) – as described above.  For purposes of our simulation, we 
assume  that  these  expectations  can  be  approximated  by  a  linear  combination  of  the 
average return on an R&D project and the full information valuation.
4 
  ENPV
i ￿  ANPV
i
0    +   ￿ ( FNPV
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0 | I0 )      (9) 
Where the parameter ￿ is an information parameter that represents how much of the 
project specific information the firm is able to observe. 
Since the basis for this distribution is the set of projects firms actually chose to 
develop during the 1990’s, we maintain that given the information set firms possessed for 
all of these projects, E(NPV0 | I0) > 0.  This puts a constraint on ￿, the amount of 
information the firms actually have at the time of making this critical decision. 
 
IV.  DATA 
 
The critical data needed to calibrate our financial Go/No-go investment model are 
the mean and standard deviation of developmental costs and revenues.  For development 
costs we also require a measure of the covariation in costs across development phases.  
                                                            
3 Using data from successful projects, we construct estimates of the parameters of this distribution of 
potential projects and use simulation to generate potential projects.  For the current analysis, we assume 
there is only one distribution from which projects are drawn.  Future work will examine whether there are 
different distributions based on whether the product is a “novel” compound or a “me-too.” 
 
4 We draw an analogy to a similar forecasting question.  How would one rationally form a forecast for the 
number of points Allen Iverson (point guard for the Philadelphia 76ers) score in tonight’s game?  First, one 
would look at Allen’s long term scoring average.  Then one would adjust this average upwards or 
downwards depending upon how he had been playing lately, on who the opponent was, whether there were 
any key injuries on either team.  On average, such a forecast would be right.  However, using this 
methodology, one would never accurately predict the extreme games; thus the variance in the forecasts 
would be much lower than the variance in the actual outcomes.   19 
DiMasi et al (2003) provides information on the mean, median, standard deviation, and 
correlation across phases of R&D developmental costs.  These estimates are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
 
These cost data represent the average after-tax out-of-pocket expenses for projects 
in  each  phase  (rather  than  annual  costs).    Thus,  it  is  necessary,  and  appropriate,  to 
discount these back to the time of the Phase I Go/No-go decision, as done in equation (2).  
For purposes of the simulation, we assume that these costs are distributed log-normally.  
In addition to these cost estimates, DiMasi and colleagues also report statistics on the 
median developmental time per stage, and the probability of success for each stage.  We 
assume that these values are fixed across projects and common knowledge to all firms. 
On  the  revenue-side  of  our  model,  we  rely  on  the  data  from  Grabowski  and 
Vernon (2000) and Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi (2002).  These studies provide data 
on  the  distribution  of  the  after-tax  net  present  value  of  a  product’s  worldwide  sales 
revenues, and  are reported on a decile-by-decile basis.   Importantly, these data were 
collected  from  products  brought  to  market  during  the  same  time  period  as  that  the 
products in the DiMasi et al. cost study were brought to market (Grabowski, Vernon, and 
DiMasi, 2002).  These data, which are presented in Figure 2, represent after-tax revenues, 
net of promotional activities and rebates, and are discounted to the launch date.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Therefore, in our analyses, we only need to discount these values back to the time of the 
Go / No-Go decision.  Again, for purposes of our simulation analyses, we model the 
revenues as having a log-normal distribution.  As a result, the 10
th decile drug products in 
the simulations are slightly positive in present value, rather than the slightly negative as 
was  shown  in  figure  2.    Based  on  these  parameters,  we  developed  a  Monte  Carlo 
simulation model to generate values of (c1,c2,c3,Rn)
i for a set of potential projects firms 
could invest in. 
 
V.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
The theoretical model of project valuation assumes that decisions are made on an 
annual basis.  In pharmaceutical product development, the process is divided into three 
specific stages of development: phases I, II, and III.  At the end of each stage, there is a 
project review to determine whether the data are sufficient to continue development.  For 
our empirical work we focus on these stages as shown diagrammatically below in Figure 
3.   
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This means that we need to re-write our equations in terms on these developmental 
stages, rather than years. 
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where the only tricky part is the discounting.  We need to define time with respect to the 
phase I Go/No-Go decision, where  ' 1 t ,  ' 2 t , and  ' 3 t represent the median expenditure times 
during each phase of development. 
Equation (10) can be calculated either with sample means (i.e. no information), 
full information or firm specific private information (i.e. conditional expectations) 
yielding ANPV, FNPV or E(NPV | I0) depending on which data are used for the costs abd 
revenues.  Likewise we are able to construct our estimated ENPV. 
 
Tuning the Model  
 
In section III we laid out the rational for combining the full-information estimate with the 
no-information estimate to form tuned estimates of the distribution of firm expectations.  
The constant ￿ in equation (9) is the primary method of doing this tuning.  Specifically, 
we selected for ￿ that value which led to 98% of the baseline projects having a positive 
ENPV  –  see  figure  4.
5    This  corresponds  to  ￿  =  10%.    Using  this  value  for  the 
information parameter results in the distribution of ENPV shown in figure 5.
6  
                                                            
5 The rationale for choosing such a high confidence level is the following: we know that the observed 
projects from which our data are drawn are ones that real firms invested real money into developing.  Thus, 
we would rationally expect them to have believed that these projects had positive NPV.  At the same time 
we know that there are many, unobserved, projects that these firms chose not to invest in.  Thus our sample 
is a selected group from the population of all possible projects and represents those that in the current 
environment firms are willing to invest in.  If there were additional positive NPV projects, we would have 
expected these firms to invest in them as well.  Thus, our expectation is that the marginal project should 
have just passed the financial threshold, i.e. E(NPV) = 0.   We approximate this marginal project as being at 
the 98
th percentile of our observed distribution. 
 
6 It is critical to note, however, that if one thought these were random projects drawn from a broader 
distribution of potential projects (some with positive and some with negative NPV), then one might have 
expected to find more of a censored distribution.  That is, there would be a lot of projects that would have 
just barely made it – especially if we think that we are observing the upper tail of the distribution and that 
there are many more unprofitable projects than profitable ones.  However, in our defense, the distribution is 
nicely skewed and reflects both the type I and type II errors involved in firms estimating the ex-post 
financial return on a given project. 
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[INSERT FIGURES 4, 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
V.  PRICE CONTROL SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
   
To examine the impact of various political actions that could influence the price of drugs 
in the US, we need to estimate the impact of these policies on the net revenues of the 
firm.  We assume that most of the distribution and promotional costs are largely fixed, 
and that the impact of price changes on net revenues will be driven primarily by its 
impacts on total revenues.  Furthermore, we assume that whatever the environmental 
policy is, either direct price controls or large-scale importation from Canada or other 
countries, the expected impact on branded products is uniform across the projects and is 
not  targeted  only  at  the  “block-buster”  products.    We  also  assume  that  these 
environmental  changes  can  be  summarized  in  terms  of  the  average  price  change  – 
compared  to  what  would  have  been  expected  based  on  the  current  US  market 
environment.    Under  these  conditions,  the  expected  change  in  net  revenues  can  be 
calculated in a straightforward manner as follows: 
   
%DRevenues =  (1 – ￿)´ (U.S. Market Share) ´ (%DPrices)            (11) 
 
For our simulation analysis, we use as the base case an elasticity of demand of -0.3, and 
then examine a wide range of values in the sensitivity analysis.  This value is consistent 
with recent estimates of the elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals in the United States 
(Coulson and Stuart, 1995).   23 
  For  purposes  of  the  simulation  experiments,  it  is  also  important  to  know  the 
impact that the environmental changes have on the standard deviation of the revenues.  
Under the assumption that the price effects are uniform across all products, the impact on 
the standard deviation is of the same proportion: 
 
%DSD  =  (1 – ￿) ´ (US Market Share) ´ (%Dprices)              (12) 
 
The results of price changes of various magnitudes are shown in Figure 6.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As shown, relatively modest price changes, such as 5 or 10%, are estimated to have 
relatively  little  impact  on  the  incentives  for  product  development
7.    Our  empirical 
estimates  suggest  that  product  development  would  decrease  only  about  5  percent.  
Steeper cuts, like those suggested by some proponents of importation from Canada (e.g. 
40 to 45% price reductions) would result in significant decreases in R&D investment.  




VI.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
   
Our  paper  examines  the  impact  that  policy  changes  that  succeed  in  cutting 
pharmaceutical prices in the United States would have on the incentives for private firms 
to  invest  in  pharmaceutical  research  and  development.    The  current  system  of  drug 
                                                            
7 This is, of course, a result of not having a truly censored distribution but having a more normal shaped 
distribution.   24 
development  relies  on  private  firms  to  make  significant  investments  in  developing 
products to bring to the market.  Successful firms are rewarded for their innovation with 
patent protection and the ability to price products, in the United States, at prevailing 
market  prices.    Many  are  concerned  that  these  protections  encourage  pharmaceutical 
firms  to  exploit  consumers  and  price  their  products  unfairly.    Presumably,  the 
exploitation is facilitated by the inefficiencies generated through the existing insurance 
system, that encourages those with insurance to choose expensive therapies, which then 
pushes up prices for everyone. 
  Our simulations find that if successful, cutting pharmaceutical prices significantly 
(40 to 45%) would have a significant impact on the incentives for private firms to invest 
in  research  and  development.    Specifically,  our  results  suggest  that  the  number  of 
compounds moving from the laboratory into human trials would decrease by 50 to 60 
percent.  Because of the uncertainties involved, fewer compounds moving into clinical 
trials directly translates into fewer new products – the effects of which wouldn’t be fully 
felt for several decades because of the long development cycle.  Moreover, because of the 
spillover  effects  of  R&D,  less  activity  today  reduces  the  possibilities  for  new 
opportunities in the future.  Thus, these effects would likely compound themselves over 
time. 
 
Limitations and Caveats  
 
There are a number of limitations and caveats to the current analysis.  Although 
we  believe  that  the  parameters  of  the  model  accurately  portray  the  current  state  of 
pharmaceutical research and development, this process continues to evolve – particularly   25 
as a result of information generated through the Human Genome project.  Most observers 
believe that the impact of our growing knowledge of the effects of genes and proteins 
will be the potential to develop highly targeted drugs for specific genotypes.  The impact 
of  this  on  the  financial  incentives  for  R&D  could  be  dramatic;  as  the  costs  of 
development appear to be increasing and the potential market for each product seem to be 
shrinking.  Thus, one might expect the prices of these newer, individualized medicines, to 
be extraordinarily high if they are to provide positive NPV projects at the initial Go / No-
Go decision point.  Policies that put pressure on pharmaceutical prices could be expected 
to stifle such innovation. 
A second limitation of the model is that it assumes that there is little impact on the 
costs  of  development.    If  public  policies  were  crafted  in  such  a  way  as  to  increase 
government  support  for  research  and  development  as  prices  (and  hence  expected 
revenues) are reduced, either in the form of greater investment in basic science or more 
targeted  support  for  clinical  development,  these  incentives  could  offset  some  of  the 
effects of the price regulation. 
Third, throughout the analysis we assumed that there were no changes in the level 
of  promotional  activity.    Implicitly,  we  are  assuming  that  promotional  activities  are 
pursued to the extent that they  are  rational to  do so, i.e. to the point that additional 
promotion does not provide a positive ROI.  Furthermore, we assumed that when faced 
with  modest  price  cuts,  these  promotional  activities  were  fixed.    This  enabled  us  to 
translate  the  effects  of  prices  on  total  revenues  into  the  effect  on  net  revenues.    If, 
however, there were concurrent changes that reduced the need for promotional activities, 
such as broader Medicare coverage and fewer formulary restrictions, then these liberating   26 
policies might stimulate demand and maintain revenue expectations.  However, at least 
part of the incentives for making political change in today’s environment is precisely 
fears that demand will be stimulated.  Thus, policy makers, by and large, are concerned 
primarily about total expenditures for drugs (not prices per se) and what is one persons’ 
expenditure is another person’s revenue.  Thus, it does not appear that if policy makers 
were able to enact price controls of one form or another, they would be inclined to offset 
the impact of those budget controls by enacting policies that would stimulate demand. 
  A fourth weakness in the model is that we are unable to observe the information 
sets that firms use at the critical decision time to bring a project into clinical testing.  We 
had to approximate this by the use of the information parameter, ￿   Our sensitivity 
analysis, however, shows that our fundamental conclusions – large price cuts lead to 
large reductions in R&D investment is insensitive to this assumption. 
A final criticism that we have heard of this approach is that we do not allow for 
firms to engage in a variety of strategic behavior that might thwart the intent of policy 
makers.  Such behavior might include restricting the supply of drugs to Canada, tying 
wholesalers’  hands  with  contracts  prohibiting  them  from  re-exporting  and  other  such 
mechanisms.  While such behavior is perhaps likely, we mitigate the need to examine the 
direct consequences of such policy  changes by instead using the expected impact on 
prices as the driving policy parameter.  If one believes that policies such as Canadian re-
importation will only have a limited impact on US prices because of strategic behavior on 
the part of the industry, then assume the impact on prices will be small and our model 
suggest that the impact on R&D activity will be corresponding small.  
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Figure 2:  Distribution of Product Net Revenues 
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Figure 4: Proportion of ENPV>0 as a Function of 
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Figure 6:  Impact of Price Reductions 
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Figure 7:  Sensitivity Analysis on Price Elasticity 
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Figure 8:  Sensitivity analysis of Tuning Parameter 
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